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Insights from one year of tracking a polymorphic threat
A little over a year ago, in October 2018, our polymorphic outbreak monitoring system detected a large surge in reports, indicating that a large-scale campaign was unfolding.
If not stopped, Dexphot ultimately ran a cryptocurrency miner on the device, with monitoring services and scheduled tasks triggering re-infection when defenders attempt to remove the malware.
In the months that followed, we closely tracked the threat and witnessed the attackers upgrade the malware, target new processes, and work around defensive measures:
While Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection’s pre-execution detection engines blocked Dexphot in most cases, behavior-based machine learning models provided protection for cases where the threat slipped through.
Given the threat’s persistence mechanisms, polymorphism, and use of fileless techniques, behavior-based detection was a critical component of the comprehensive protection against this malware and other threats that exhibit similar malicious behaviors.
During the execution stage, Dexphot writes five key files to disk: Except for the installer, the other processes that run during execution are legitimate system processes.
These legitimate system processes include msiexec.exe (for installing MSI packages), unzip.exe (for extracting files from the password-protected ZIP archive), rundll32.exe (for loading the loader DLL), schtasks.exe (for scheduled tasks), powershell.exe (for forced updates).
The ZIP archive usually contains three files: the loader DLL, an encrypted data file (usually named bin.dat), and, often, one clean unrelated DLL, which is likely included to mislead detection.
Detecting malicious code hidden using this method is not trivial, so process hollowing has become a prevalent technique used by malware today.
Not only is it harder to detect the malicious code while it’s running, it’s harder to find useful forensics after the process has stopped.
To initiate process hollowing, the loader DLL targets two legitimate system processes, for example svchost.exe or nslookup.exe, and spawns them in a suspended state.
Dexphot also generates the names for the tasks at runtime, which means a simple block list of hardcoded task names will not be effective in preventing them from running.
The MSI packages generally include a clean version of unzip.exe, a password-protected ZIP file, and a batch file that checks for currently installed antivirus products.
The domain address usually ends in a .info or .net TLD, while the file name for the actual payload consists of random characters, similar to the randomness previously seen being used to generate file names and scheduled tasks.
Its goal is a very common one in cybercriminal circles — to install a coin miner that silently steals computer resources and generates revenue for the attackers — yet Dexphot exemplifies the level of complexity and rate of evolution of even everyday threats, intent on evading protections and motivated to fly under the radar for the prospect of profit.
To combat threats, several next-generation protection engines in Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection’s antivirus component detect and stop malicious techniques at multiple points along the attack chain.
Memory scans detect and terminate the loading of malicious code hidden by process hollowing — including the monitoring processes that attempt to update the malware code and re-infect the machine via PowerShell commands.
Behavioral blocking and containment capabilities are especially effective in defeating Dexphot’s fileless techniques, detection evasion, and persistence mechanisms, including the periodic and boot-time attempts to update the malware via scheduled tasks.
The detection, blocking, and remediation of Dexphot on endpoints are exposed in Microsoft Defender Security Center, where Microsoft Defender ATP’s rich capabilities like endpoint detection and response, automated investigation and remediation, and others enable security operations teams to investigate and remediate attacks in enterprise environments.
Announcing Windows 10 Insider Preview Build 19033
Hello Windows Insiders, today we’re releasing Windows 10 Insider Preview Build 19033 (20H1) to Windows Insiders in BOTH the Fast ring and Slow ring.
You can also check out the rest of our documentation here including a complete list of new features and updates that have gone out as part of Insider flights for the current development cycle.
For Insiders in the Fast ring who have selected to stop getting Insider Preview builds when the next major release of Windows 10 is available under Windows Insider Settings, we will be moving you to the Slow ring as part of honoring this setting.